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Inequality in the Creative City
In keeping with tradition, Carolina Planning is proud to present here an adaptation of the Department of City 
& Regional Planning’s 2006 Best Master’s Project, written by Ph.D. student Mary Donegan.  In her award-win-
ning article, Donegan critiques Richard Florida’s popular “Creative Class” theory for central city revitalization, 
the trendy notion that cities need to attract highly educated, young, white-collar workers for information-age, 
“creative” professions by catering specifically to the needs of these up-scale professionals.  Despite some notable 
successes in urban revitalization, the creative class approach inherently produces a sharp increase in income 
inequality.  Donegan’s article explains the reasons behind such inequality and proposes several city-level policies 
to address this problem.  These proposals include the following:  living wage campaigns; unionization efforts 
among service workers; and the use of immigrant work centers to better integrate immigrants into a city’s legal 
labor market.
Mary Donegan, MRP 2006
Richard Florida’s book, The Rise of the Creative Class, 
has captured the imaginations of economic developers, 
businessmen, and urban dwellers alike.  Florida’s thesis 
is that the role of place is changing as the American 
economy transitions from traditional industry to high-
tech, advanced services.  Whereas people once followed 
jobs in traditional industries, jobs now follow mobile, 
creative people—people who increasingly base their 
locational decisions not on job opportunities, but on 
the urban amenities and cultural environment of a city. 
Florida argues that the economic prosperity of a city is 
not based solely on traditional economic development 
strategies, but is, instead, based largely on the city’s 
success in attracting and retaining creative people, who 
in turn drive the economy (Florida, 2002). 
Florida’s idea has proven to be infectious: chasing the 
creative class has replaced cluster theory as today’s ubiq-
uitous economic development strategy.  Cities across 
the globe have latched onto his creative roadmap, trans-
forming old factories into swanky loft spaces, opening 
trendy coffee shops, and promoting local art galleries, 
all in an effort to please the fickle creative class.
Yet with all the hype surrounding the creative class 
strategy, a potentially troubling side effect has emerged: 
inequality.  Florida himself acknowledges this as an 
unfortunate, yet seemingly unavoidable side-effect of 
the creative class.  According to Florida and his col-
laborator, Kevin Stolarick, a strong correlation exists 
between the presence of the creative class in metropoli-
tan areas and income inequality.  Cities that rank high 
on Florida’s “Creativity Index” also rank high on the 
“Inequality Index,” a measure of occupational income 
premiums created by Stolarick (Florida 2002, 2005; 
Stolarick, 2003).  
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This correlation between the creative class and income 
inequality presents a dilemma for cities seeking to fol-
low Florida’s strategies—is it possible to follow a cre-
ative class strategy of development without accepting 
inequality as an unavoidable side-effect?  In this paper, 
I argue that, while inequality is undoubtedly a complex 
phenomenon—one that is increasingly garnering atten-
tion in the national media—there are very real policies 
that local governments can and should enact in an effort 
to reduce inequality.  Furthermore, I argue that these 
policies can be adopted without abandoning Florida’s 
core economic development strategies.1 
INEQUALITY AND THE CREATIVE CLASS
Just one year after the release of The Rise of the Creative 
Class, Kevin Stolarick created the Inequality Index to 
measure the relationship between inequality and the 
creative class by capturing the occupational pay ratio 
between the creative class and the noncreative classes. 
In a piece released by Florida’s consulting arm, Sto-
larick announced that this Index reveals a relationship 
between being a creative city and having an unequal 
workforce, proclaiming that, “inequality goes hand and 
hand with being a cutting-edge, technologically innova-
tive, creative region” (Stolarick, 2003).  The higher the 
creative class percentage of the workforce (the creative 
class being the “economic base” of Florida’s new cre-
ative economy), the more the creative class earns per 
year relative to the noncreative classes.  
According to Florida and Stolarick, this correlation re-
flects the fact that the creative class “outsources” much 
of the low-skill service activity, generating a creative-
noncreative division of labor (Florida, 2002; Stolarick, 
2003).  Florida and Stolarick maintain that the strong 
relationship between the creative class and inequality is 
due to the hectic lifestyle of the creative class, which is 
comprised of busy people who have neither the time nor 
the inclination to perform life’s daily chores.  Instead, 
the creative class relies on an “army of ‘servants’” to 
cater to their everyday needs (Stolarick, 2003).  Both 
Stolarick and Florida reason that it is this “massive 
functional division of human labor [that produces] the 
bulk of our income divide” (Stolarick, 2003).  
Yet a simple division of labor does little to explain 
exactly why the two groups are earning such unequal 
wages—that is, it does little to explain the actual roots 
of inequality in the creative city.  Labor economists and 
sociologists have pointed to a myriad of explanations 
that could help answer the question of what causes in-
equality.  These factors include: skill-biased technical 
change in the workplace; differing levels of human 
capital; de-industrialization and the resultant decline 
in manufacturing employment; rising levels of immi-
gration; de-unionization; and a declining minimum 
wage.  Levy and Murnane (1992) provide a thorough 
overview of many of these factors; Acemoglu (2001), 
Borjas, Katz, and Freeman (1997), Card (2001), Cline 
(2001), Dinardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), Fortin 
and Lemieux (1997), Osterman (1999), Reed (2001), 
Sassen-Koob, (1984), Topel (1994), and Wood (1995) 
provide additional background information in these ar-
eas and were instrumental in the development of my 
theoretical approach.
Yet while Florida has paid increasing attention to the is-
sue of inequality (Florida 2005, 2006), he provides few 
workable policy solutions to the issue, short of suggest-
ing that the creative class should, “…[offer] those in 
the other classes a tangible vision of ways to improve 
their own positions, either by becoming part of the Cre-
ative Economy or coexisting with it…” (Florida, 2002). 
More recently, Florida has suggested looking to com-
panies like Whole Foods and Best Buy as models for 
high-wage service jobs, but he again does little to sug-
gest exactly how other low-skill service companies can 
learn from them (Florida 2006).  
In the remaining sections of this paper, I will focus on 
two policies that can be used to limit inequality in the 
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creative city.  The first is to push for higher statewide 
minimum wages, through coalitions built around local 
living wage campaigns.  The second is to work with 
immigrant “work centers” and organized labor unions 
towards the goal of integrating immigrants into local 
labor market institutions.2
Policy: Higher State Minimum Wages and well-
structured “Living Wages”
Based on the statistical findings presented by Donegan 
(2006), it is clear that metropolitan areas in states with a 
minimum wage higher than the federal minimum have 
lower levels of creative-noncreative inequality, suggest-
ing that regions should pursue a policy of higher state 
minimum wages to decrease inequality.  Unfortunately, 
outside of pushing state representatives for higher mini-
mum wages, this might give the impression that local 
actors—the very people promoting Florida’s strate-
gies—have few policy avenues to pursue in this area.  
The opposite is true, however:  a living wage campaign 
may represent an alternative policy route, one that is 
complementary to pushing for higher state minimum 
wages.  A living wage is a wage rate, established by 
local legislation, which is set above the prevailing mini-
mum wage in an area.  Living wages differ from state 
minimum wages in that state minimum wages typically 
apply to all companies, whereas local living wages are 
usually limited to either government contractors, busi-
nesses seeking public assistance, and/or social service 
providers.  Relative to either state or federal minimum 
wages, therefore, living wages reach far fewer low-wage 
workers; Brenner estimates that living wages reach less 
than one percent of workers in cities that have imple-
mented them (Brenner, 2004).  While many economists 
point to the potentially damaging effects of living wages 
on the local economy and workers—examples include 
reduced employment, firm relocation, and decreased 
city bids—case studies of living wage laws have not in 
fact found these adverse consequences.3  
Two aspects of the living wage ordinance are critical 
in the development of an eventual statewide minimum 
wage that can successfully meet the goal of reducing 
inequality.4  The first is the structure of the living wage 
legislation, which determines both the scale of the cov-
erage and the enforcement for violators.  The second is 
the makeup and involvement of the coalition that push-
es for the living wage.  This is critical for the success of 
the ordinance’s passage, the ability to withstand intense 
anti-living wage pressure, the success of compliance 
and enforcement, and the likelihood of any possible fu-
ture expansion in coverage. 
Legislation
In terms of legislation, the broader the number of affect-
ed industries, the more workers that will benefit from 
the living wage, and the greater its overall benefit.  City 
or county governments are often large and disjointed, 
and mandating that workers across all departments and 
divisions are covered is essential, not only because it 
will ensure that as many workers as possible are cov-
ered, but because it will limit the amount of cross-de-
partmental shifting that can occur in order to avoid the 
living wage. 
It is important to note, however, that the living wage 
will never reach these workers if the municipality does 
not enforce it, making enforcement a critical piece of 
the legislation.  The legislation must include budgets for 
city oversight of the living wage ordinance, and clear 
punishments for companies who do not follow it (Luce, 
2005).  Successful living wage legislation should also 
include provisions for educating workers about their 
rights under the new living wage law, and protections 
for whistleblowers who report companies that are not 
paying the living wage, so that workers who are getting 
paid below the wage are willing and able to report these 
violations. (Zabin and Martin, 1999).  
Coalition
The coalition that works towards living wage legisla-
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tion is critical to determining its ultimate success, since 
a living wage that has been developed with input from 
a broad-based, strong coalition is more likely to have a 
broader scope, and is more likely to include legislation 
for enforcement (Luce, 2005).  Ideally, a living wage 
campaign coalition would involve the participation of 
labor, religious, community, and political groups (Bern-
stein, 2005; Zabin and Martin, 1999).  This broad coali-
tion would be able to achieve a hegemonic critical mass 
that would be better able to rally the support of voters or 
officials to pass the living wage legislation.   
Ultimately, the ability to influence inequality rests on 
the ability to implement a state-wide minimum wage. 
It is here that the coalition involved in building sup-
port for the living wage is crucial.  A good example of 
how living wage campaigns have the potential to flow 
upwards from the local level to exact state-level change 
is in Michigan, which recently passed a statewide 
minimum wage that will reach $7.40 an hour by 2008. 
Michigan has some of the oldest living wage laws in the 
country, initially beginning in cities and gradually ex-
panding to include counties.  More recently, a statewide 
minimum wage increase proved enormously success-
ful, overwhelming initial opposition by the  Republi-
can-led state legislature after a petition drive to put the 
minimum wage on the November ballot collected over 
150,000 signatures in the state, and appeared poised 
to roll to victory at the polls that November (ACORN, 
2006).  In the face of imminent defeat at the polls, the 
Republican-led legislature relented from their opposi-
tion and passed a minimum wage law in the month be-
fore the election.
The successful petition drive to put the issue on the 
ballot was led by the Association for Community Or-
ganization for Reform Now (ACORN),5 the Michigan 
Democratic Party, labor organizations, and community 
and faith-based organizations.  An economic justice or-
ganization was also instrumental in the campaign, as 
living wages are fast becoming contested terrain, and 
increasingly require legal assistance to both write laws 
and hold off anti-living wage legal assaults (ACORN, 
2006).  To my knowledge, no formal case study of Mich-
igan’s recent successful effort to increase the minimum 
wage exists; the strategies used in Michigan and similar 
states around the country—from Arkansas to Maine—
are clearly areas that need further research.  Moreover, 
the momentum built over the prior decade through lo-
cal organizing and victorious living wage campaigns 
proved instrumental in leading to the increase in the 
state minimum wage; this provides a clear example of 
the power of local action.   
To some, implementing a living wage may seem like a 
small step in reducing inequality, since it reaches so few 
workers.  For example, San Jose, California currently 
has one of the highest living wages, but occupies the 
highest position on Florida’s inequality index, demon-
strating all too clearly that living wages are not a pana-
cea.  Yet, as the Michigan example shows, the passage 
of a living wage supported by a grassroots coalition is 
more than just a living wage:  it is a step towards form-
ing effective coalitions that can work towards achiev-
ing larger, state-wide goals that also address issues of 
inequality. 
In addition to focusing on increasing state (or even fed-
eral) minimum wages, successful coalitions can turn 
their attention to the future by focusing on expanding 
the local living wage to more sectors.  In doing so, they 
can direct their attention to workplaces or sectors that 
are strategic targets for unionization (Zabin and Mar-
tin, 1999).  Additionally, the living wage coalitions can 
be critical in uniting immigrants with non-immigrant 
groups, a strategy that is critical for our second policy. 
The passage of local living wages, in conjunction with 
labor and immigrant movements, may indirectly lead to 
large-scale reductions in local inequality.
Policy: Integrate Immigrants into Community 
Groups, Educational Programs
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A second set of results from the regression models in 
Donegan (2006) reveals that MSAs with higher num-
bers of immigrants have higher inequality between 
creative and noncreative workers, pointing to another 
policy issue.  While some may interpret this result as a 
call to expel immigrants from the country, this would 
be misguided; it is the structure of the economy, with its 
emphasis on low-cost and often informal subcontract-
ing under poorly-enforced labor laws that links immi-
grant labor to inequality. The answer then is not to ex-
pel immigrants, but to further pull them into the formal 
American economy. 
It can be tricky to involve immigrants in the formal la-
bor market—especially if they are undocumented—but 
it is not impossible.  Janice Fine has documented the 
emergence of a new form of immigrant labor market 
institution: the worker center, which is a “community-
based mediating institution that provide[s] support to 
low-wage workers,” and where “…advocacy and orga-
nizing activities are the priority” (Fine, 2006).  Though 
originally formed by blacks in the American South to 
combat institutionalized racism, worker centers are now 
identified more with immigrant labor, which fill almost 
80% of worker center organizations.  
Along side these efforts, organized labor unions also 
have a significant contributing role to play in integrat-
ing immigrants in the mainstream labor market, espe-
cially in linking with immigrant work centers.  This is 
not the case, however.  Mirroring the negligible levels 
of union engagement with this issue in North Carolina, 
very few immigrant work centers throughout the coun-
try have strong, ongoing relationships with unions.  Of 
the working centers researched by Fine, only 15% had 
a strong, working relationship with unions.  An impres-
sive 82% percent had only “occasional partnerships,” 
while 3% had no partnerships at all with unions (Fine, 
2006).  Fine relates that immigrant work centers com-
plained of having workplaces that wanted to organize, 
but that they failed to find a union to help them do so 
(Fine, 2006).  When workplaces and unions did work 
together, they were not always successful at unionizing 
a firm—or of even getting to that late stage in the union-
ization process.
The lack of interaction between unions and immigrant 
work centers is a serious, but not an entirely surprising, 
concern.  Unions and immigrants have had a volatile 
past; unions have traditionally viewed immigrants as 
threatening (since immigrants often work in the same 
sectors as unionized workers, though through informal 
arrangements and for very low wages), even though in 
the long-term immigrants could grow the ranks of union 
members (Briggs, 1998).  This tension between the 
short-term and the long-term roles of immigrants has 
led to strains between immigrant groups and unions.  
By not working with immigrant centers, however, 
unions may be limiting their long-term ability to protect 
the economic well being of the less-educated and less-
skilled American worker.  In an era when union mem-
bership is declining, this is a troubling sign that unions 
are still unable to work effectively with immigrants, but 
one that is not entirely surprising.  Fine relates that there 
is a “dramatic culture clash” that occurs between unions 
and immigrant activists at the worker centers.  Immi-
grants at work centers claim that unions are “top-down, 
undemocratic, and disconnected from the community;” 
unions claim that immigrants are unfamiliar with union-
ization laws, and are unrealistic about the time and ef-
forts that are required to win a union drive (Fine, 2006). 
If the immigrant worker centers and labor organizations 
are involved as part of a broader coalition in a living 
wage campaign, however, these cultural “clashes” can 
be avoided:  the living wage campaign could act as a 
“getting to know you” period, where the unions and im-
migrant work centers could learn each other’s norms 
and cultures.  
There are working models that show how success can 
be accomplished.  In Lowell, Massachussetts, the com-
33Inequality in the Creative City
munity group Coalition for a Better Acre (CBA), com-
prised of immigrants and minorities from one of Low-
ell’s poorest and oldest immigrant neighborhoods (the 
Acre, with a poverty rate of over 40%), acted in con-
junction with local unions, the University of Massachu-
setts-Lowell (UMASS-Lowell), the Cambodian Mutual 
Assistance Association, and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) to integrate their residents into Low-
ell’s process of redeveloping local brownfields.  This 
was no small task; Lowell, the birthplace of America’s 
textile industry, has one of the highest concentrations 
of brownfields in the United States, and most of these 
brownfields are in financially poor, ethnic, and minority 
communities.  
One of the first and most ambitious steps in Lowell’s 
redevelopment was the construction of a ballpark and 
a hockey arena to house the city’s minor league base-
ball and hockey teams (among other projects, including 
building new housing and grocery stores on brownfields 
in the low-income neighborhoods).  Rather than simply 
hire outside contractors or rely on cheap, unskilled la-
bor in facilitating redevelopment, the CBA and the EPA 
worked together with local Boston unions and UMASS-
Lowell to train Acre residents in high-paying, high-skill 
environmental testing and construction jobs.  Workers 
in the program were placed in apprenticeship programs 
with the local unions, ensuring that they would have a 
good chance of receiving long-term union jobs after the 
program’s completion.  In the end, Lowell’s program 
brought good-quality jobs to some of Lowell’s poor-
est residents, and integrated a long-standing immigrant 
community into the city redevelopment process (United 
States Environmental Protection Agency, 2002; Nation-
al Institute of Environmental Health Services, 2000).  
In terms of policy solutions, it is important to note that 
the local government in Lowell acted as the facilitator 
between the union and immigrant workers, bringing 
the two together with EPA funding.  In fact, the City 
of Lowell mandates that 30% of workers on brown-
field remediation sites be local, further emphasizing the 
leading role of local labor in ensuring local economic 
development from redevelopment strategies (United 
States Environmental Protection Agency, 2002).  The 
relevant players in Lowell recognized similar advantag-
es to working together:  the city recognized long-term 
economic development opportunities in the immigrant 
neighborhoods; the unions gained future well-trained 
members; and the immigrants were given the opportu-
nity to further integrate into the unions and city devel-
opment process, resulting in greater economic oppor-
tunities. 
The Lowell case is underscored by the fact that the city 
has been following a creative class strategy, actively 
luring artists and bohemians away from overpriced lofts 
and apartments in Cambridge and Boston to lofts, apart-
ments, restaurants, galleries, and shops that fill the city’s 
newly renovated mills along its canals and river (City of 
Lowell, 2006; Galvin, 2006).  Indeed, it is the creative 
class strategy that has led Lowell to clean up its brown-
fields and redevelop its mills (Galvin, 2006).  Clearly, 
creative redevelopment can involve both unions and 
immigrant communities while achieving joint benefits 
for all; as this case evidences, it is clearly possible to 
have “creative class trickle down” through the active 
leadership of community, immigrant, and labor organi-
zations.
Conclusion
Whether economic developers and academics approve 
of the creative class strategy or not, it is here to stay—
at least until the next hot development strategy comes 
along.  Considering the popularity of this theory, the 
striking overlap between being a creative city and be-
ing an unequal city is troubling—not only for ethical 
and political concerns, but also because it could have 
severe implications for the long-term sustainability of 
the economy.   
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Policymakers and activists in regions following a cre-
ative class strategy can and should take steps to ensure 
that the inequality associated with Florida’s creative 
class is kept at bay.  As cities adopt ever-popular creative 
class strategies, the adverse consequence of inequality 
must be considered and addressed.  Local policymakers 
must remove their blinders and confront the side-effects 
of inequality head on.  
Through the policies proposed above, I have sought to 
answer the question:  is it possible to become a creative 
center while staving off the adverse consequence of in-
equality?  The answer, I propose, is yes.  Broad-based 
coalitions comprised of faith-based, immigrant, labor, 
and political groups must work together—and with 
policymakers—to push for local living wages and the 
integration of immigrant groups into the labor market. 
While the actual policies implemented in each city may 
be different, city officials must consider creative strat-
egies to reduce inequality as they work to implement 
“creative class” strategies to spur the economy.  
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Endnotes
1  In this paper, I will not address the efficacy of Florida’s 
creative class strategy in generating economic growth or 
development; see Rausch and Negrey (2006) for a recent 
assessment.  
2  These policies are an outgrowth of earlier regression 
models in Donegan (2006) that tested the relationship 
between both Florida’s Creative Class Index and traditional 
causal variables of inequality, and a dependent variable 
of Stolarick’s Inequality Index, in US metropolitan areas 
(MSAs).  While the models are cross-sectional and cannot 
fully address causality, they provide a series of insights, 
several of which I considered useful for potential policies.  
First, there is a significant positive relationship between the 
creative class and inequality.  Second, MSAs in states with 
higher minimum wages and high unionization levels have 
significantly lower levels of inequality, while MSAs with a 
high immigrant population had significantly higher levels 
of inequality.  Third, there is a significant, positive relation-
ship between skill-biased technical change and inequality. 
This could indicate that the benefits of the “new economy” 
may not be reaching all levels of employment—a sugges-
tion that has been made by numerous economists (see, for 
example, Dew-Becker and Gordon, 2005). Policies must 
therefore focus on reducing the impact of technical change 
on less-skilled workers. Each of the policies presented in 
this paper seeks to accomplish this by improving the eco-
nomic position of less-skilled workers, and each, therefore, 
indirectly addresses the role of skill-biased technical change 
in inequality.
3  See Benner (2004) for a discussion of this.
4  To date, very few robust statistical studies have been 
conducted on the effects of living wages on raising the 
economic position of low-wage workers (and thus reducing 
inequality) in part because national data sets have limita-
tions that preclude their use in living wage models.  See 
Bernstein (2005) and Brenner (2004) for discussion about 
these methodological constraints.  
5 ACORN is an international group of community organiza-
tions that is at the forefront of living wage organizing.
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